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Evidence suggests that a large majority of firms and individuals comply with regulations 
and tax laws even though the frequency of inspections and audits is often low. Moreover, fines 
for noncompliance are also typically low when regulatory violations are discovered. These 
observations are not consistent with static compliance models. Harrington (1988) modified these 
static models by specifying a dynamic game in which some agents have an incentive to comply 
even when the cost of compliance each period is greater than the expected penalty. This paper 
reports a laboratory experiment based on the Harrington model framework, in which subjects 
move between two inspection groups that differ in the probability of inspection and severity of 
fine. Subjects decide to comply or not in the presence of low, medium or high compliance costs. 
Enforcement leverage arises in the Harrington model from movement between the inspection 
groups based on previous observed compliance and noncompliance. Our results indicate that 
consistent with the model, violation rates increase when compliance costs become higher and as 
the probability of switching groups becomes lower. Behavior does not change as sharply as the 
model predicts, however, since violation rates do not jump from 0 to 1 as parameters vary across 
critical thresholds. A simple model of bounded rationality explains these deviations from optimal 
behavior.    
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Regulatory policy makers have observed that many firms and individuals comply with 
regulations even when both the frequency of audits and the penalty for violations are low. This is 
seen in areas as diverse as income tax collection, customs, antitrust laws, health and safety and 
environmental regulation. This phenomenon is difficult to explain using static enforcement 
models (for example, Linder and McCabe, 1984, Storey and McCabe, 1980, Harford, 1978) in 
which the penalty facing the firm depends only on the firm’s performance in the current period 
and not on its previous compliance record.  
Economists in recent years have proposed dynamic repeated game models to reconcile 
the low expected penalties and yet high observed compliance rates. In these models, the 
regulated firm and the enforcement agency can react to previous actions by the other 
(Landsberger and Meilijson, 1982, Greenberg, 1984, Harrington, 1988). The enforcement agency 
alters the expected penalty and the inspection frequency based on the firm’s past performance. 
Harrington finds that a firm could have an incentive to comply with regulations even though the 
costs of compliance in individual periods exceed the expected penalty for violation. This is 
important in practice because political or practical considerations often limit the size of the fine 
that can be imposed on a firm. For example, in many states there is a restriction on the size of 
penalties that can be levied for violating an environmental regulation (e.g., $5000 per day).
1   
The strategy the enforcement agency uses to achieve this result divides the firms into two 
groups, and the firms in one group face a more severe enforcement regime than the firms in the 
                                                 
1 Compliance can occur for other reasons, of course. Firms may sometimes comply with regulations to guide 
regulatory authorities to set higher standards for the whole industry, thereby increasing the costs of their rivals 
(Salop and Scheffman, 1983). Firms could also comply to obtain a reputation of being an environmentally conscious 
organization. Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) show that public recognition plays a very important role in the 
success of voluntary environmental programs. Individuals and firms could also comply with regulations because 
they are honest and get disutility from violating regulations.     2
other group. A firm’s compliance status determines which group it is in.  Each firm can move 
from one group to the other depending on its performance.  Violations discovered in the rarely 
inspected “good” group are punished by transfer into the more frequently inspected “bad” group 
and compliance discovered in the more frequently inspected group is rewarded with the chance 
of a return to the rarely inspected good group. This enforcement scheme poses a Markov 
decision problem from the firm’s perspective. The firm moves from group to group according to 
transition probabilities that depend not only on the inspection probabilities and the current state 
of the system but also on the action taken (comply or not) during that period. Harrington shows 
that firms’ optimal policies in this scheme depend upon their individual costs of compliance. 
Low cost firms are always in compliance, high cost firms are never in compliance and medium 
cost firms move in and out of compliance depending on the results of recent inspections. 
 This paper reports laboratory evidence on compliance behavior of decision makers when 
faced with enforcement conditions consistent with the Harrington model framework. We 
examine treatments in which the compliance costs are low, medium or high. In these within 
session treatments we also change the probability of the firm switching from the frequently 
inspected group to the rarely inspected group if inspected and found compliant, from 10 percent 
to 90 percent. Our results indicate that consistent with theoretical predictions, violation rates 
increase when compliance costs become higher and as the probability of switching groups 
becomes lower. Behavior does not change as sharply as the model predicts, however, since 
violation rates do not jump from 0 to 1 as parameters vary across critical thresholds. A simple 
model of bounded rationality, in which agents choose more profitable strategies with higher 
probability but not with probability one, can explain these deviations from optimal behavior.      
Although these conditional audit rules have received significant attention in the   3
theoretical literature, direct empirical evidence on their performance is scarce. Empirical 
research using field data exists (e.g., Helland, 1998, Oljaca et al., 1998, Eckert, 2004), but it is 
hampered by the absence of reliable information regarding individual reporting behavior and 
unknown compliance decisions for uninspected firms.
2 Laboratory experiments, however, are 
well suited to study the different features of compliance schemes and individual behavior within 
these schemes. Most of the existing experimental literature on compliance and auditing has 
focused on static models, where different policy changes like an increase in tax rate, a change in 
penalty rates, tax amnesties or changes in audit probabilities are introduced to determine the 
impact on compliance behavior. Alm and McKee (1998) provide a survey of this literature. 
Torgler (2002) surveys the experimental findings on the tax compliance literature with a focus on 
social norms and institutional factors, which are seen to encourage compliance.  
Alm, Cronshaw and McKee (1993) examine dynamic audit rules and compare these to a 
5 percent inspection probability random audit rule. The auditor’s discovery of non-compliant 
behavior in a random audit scheme could lead to audits of previous or future years with certainty. 
Alm et al. find that the forward looking rules achieve lower compliance rates, since in this 
scheme an individual can cheat until audited in the current period and can then avoid any 
additional penalties by reporting honestly for the next two periods. On the other hand, under the 
backward looking audit policy, an individual found to be non-compliant in the current period has 
no chance of avoiding penalties on previous periods’ records. This increases the incentive for 
individuals to comply under backward looking policies and might be more attractive from the 
viewpoint of regulators, particularly in the area of tax reporting. Backward looking schemes 
                                                 
2 Helland (1998) uses data from the American pulp and paper industry to test whether environmental regulators audit 
and fine according to the model described in Harrington (1988). He finds that firms who are discovered in violation 
experience a one or two quarter penalty period during which they are inspected more frequently.  Eckert’s (2004) 
data on Canadian petroleum storage facilities is also consistent with the Harrington framework. She finds that 
inspections deter future violations, although the effect is small.   4
however would typically not be feasible in others kinds of regulatory areas like environmental 
and natural resource management when the data (for example, for actual emissions rates) from 
previous periods cannot be checked. Therefore, forward-looking conditional audit rules like 
those studied here are practical for a wider range of applications. 
The previous research most closely related to the present study is Clark, Friesen and 
Muller (2004), which compares two dynamic audit rules: Harrington’s (1988) scheme and 
another proposed by Friesen (2003) that is designed to minimize the inspections regulators must 
make to achieve a target rate of compliance. Both the rules use the current audit record of the 
firm to assign them to different audit groups in future periods, but in Friesen’s scheme all of the 
transitions between audit groups can be probabilistic, while in Harrington’s scheme all 
transitions are deterministic except for the movement of an inspected, compliant firm from the 
bad group to the good group.  In Friesen’s optimal targeting scheme the firms face a fixed 
probability of moving from the good group to the bad group which is independent of compliance 
status in the current period. There are no inspections conducted of firms in the first group. Clark 
et al. find an enforcement possibility frontier between compliance and minimizing inspections, 
with the Friesen rule requiring slightly lower inspection rates. Their experiment focuses on a 
comparison of the two conditional audit rules against simple random auditing for a single 
compliance cost and one set of enforcement parameters in each rule.  Harrington’s rule performs 
well on certain measures, such as for the rate of compliance per inspection. This suggests that 
further exploration of the performance of this enforcement policy is warranted, and in the present 
study we consider seven different enforcement parameter and compliance cost combinations to 
more fully examine its empirical properties. These multiple treatments allow us to study how 
compliance choices respond to different enforcement rules, and estimate a boundedly rational   5
choice model to characterize behavioral responses for this type of probabilistic enforcement.   
      
2: Theoretical Framework 
We are interested in the relationship between the firm’s compliance cost, its compliance 
decisions, and the conditional audit scheme chosen by the regulator. Our experiment is structured 
by Harrington’s (1988) model, which determines for a two-state model the level of compliance 
that can be achieved when both enforcement budgets and the maximum feasible penalty are 
limited. Let G1 and G2 denote the two “inspection” groups of firms and denote the inspection 
probability in Gi as pi and the penalty for violation as Fi, with p1< p2 and F1<F2. Firms can avoid 
a violation by incurring the compliance cost c. If a firm is inspected its compliance status is 
observed perfectly.
3 Firms found to be in violation in G1 are punished by a transfer into G2 and 
firms found to be in compliance in G2 are rewarded with a chance of a return to G1. The 
probability that a firm found in compliance in G2 is returned to G1 is denoted by u. Table 1 
presents the payoffs to the firm in this game. For future reference, this table also includes the 
parameters chosen for the experiment. 
     A policy for the firm is a map f:{1, 2}Æ{0, 1} of states 1 and 2 into decisions to comply 
with (0) or violate (1) the regulations. The firm’s goal is to choose the policy that minimizes the 
present value of its expected costs over an infinite horizon. The firm has four available policies: 
f00, f01, f10 and f11, where f00 is the policy that the firm would comply in both state 1 and 2 and f01 
is the policy of complying when in G1 and violating when in G2 and so on. The expected present 
value of the policy would be the cost this period plus the expected present value discounted one 
                                                 
3 This is not a critical assumption for Harrington’s two-state model, but it is for other models. Greenberg (1984) 
showed that a three-state model, in which transitions out of a third, “habitual offender” group were impossible, can 
dramatically reduce the rate of violations compared to a two-state model. But if false positives are possible, where 
compliant firms are wrongly classified as violators with some positive probability, every firm eventually moves into 
the third group and all firms are inspected every period.   6
period. This leads to four sets of simultaneous equations which can be solved to obtain the 
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 where β is the discount factor.  
Harrington shows (his Lemma 1) that in this framework, f01 is never an optimal policy as 
it is dominated by f00 when the cost of compliance c < p2F2 and by f11 when c ≥ p2F2. Hence the 
firm chooses between three policies f00, f10, f11 and the optimal policy depends on the compliance 
costs facing the firm and the enforcement parameters chosen by the regulatory agency.  Table 2 
presents the expected payoff for each policy, based on an exogenous per-period revenue of R. 
Firms with compliance costs below a particular threshold (p1F1) always comply, and those with 
costs above a higher threshold never comply. For an intermediate range of costs the firm chooses 
policy  f10, and it cheats when in G1 and complies in G2. Ironically, for these intermediate 
compliance costs the “good guys” in G1 can afford to cheat, whereas the “bad guys” in G2 
comply until they are moved back into G1. Compared to a static model, in this dynamic model 
compliance is achieved in G2 even though the expected penalty is not large, because firms in G2 
may be allowed to return to G1 depending on their compliance record.  
The enforcement agency in this model wants to minimize the resources spent on 
monitoring and enforcement subject to achieving a target compliance rate Z. The agency has five 
parameters that can be changed to achieve desired compliance rates: the probability of 
inspections, p1 and p2, the two penalties F1 and F2 and the probability u of the firm moving back   7
into G1 if found compliant. We manipulate u as well as the compliance cost c as exogenous 
treatment variables in the experiment. For certain parameters—specifically the u=0.9, 
compliance cost=200 treatment described below—firms have an incentive to comply even 
though the expected penalty (p2F2=0.5×300=150) is less than the single period compliance cost. 
This property is termed leverage in the literature. 
In the optimal combination of enforcement parameters characterized by Harrington, 
marginal firms that adopt policy f10 just slightly prefer to comply rather than violate in G2. In our 
choice of parameters described in the next section, we avoid these optimal parameter cases in 
which individuals are nearly indifferent between two strategies. This design choice is guided by 
experience with previous experiments, which demonstrate that more than marginal incentives are 
necessary for subjects to learn optimal behavior. This is confirmed by the noisy choice model 
results reported in Section 4.3. 
 
3: Experimental Design 
We conducted 13 sessions with 8 or 9 subjects in each session. All 114 subjects were 
undergraduate students at Purdue University and were inexperienced in the sense that they had 
not participated in a similar experiment. The University of Zurich’s z-tree program was 
employed to conduct all sessions (Fischbacher, 1999). Each session lasted about 45 minutes, 
including instruction time. Payoffs in the experiment were converted using an exchange rate of 
1500 experimental dollars = 1 U.S. dollar and subject earnings ranged from 6.75 to 15.25 U.S. 
dollars, with median earnings of $12.75. These sessions constituted the first half of a longer 
session that trained subjects to make compliance choices in a study of emissions permit trading 
with imperfect enforcement (Cason and Gangadharan, 2004). Each subject made 61 separate   8
compliance choices over seven different period sequences. 
At the start of each period sequence, subjects were initially randomly assigned into 
inspection group 1 or 2, which differ in the probability of inspections and severity of fine. Each 
subject had a binary choice: whether to comply or violate in each period. If they decided to 
comply they paid a compliance cost, which remained unchanged within a period sequence but 
varied across period sequences. Subjects were inspected with a certain probability that depended 
on which group they were in. Group 1 subjects were inspected with a probability of 20 percent 
and group 2 subjects were inspected with a probability of 50 percent. Subjects were required to 
pay a fine if they did not comply in a particular period and they were inspected. The fine for 
violation was 50 experimental dollars in group 1 and 300 experimental dollars in group 2. In 
addition, subjects in group 1 were moved to group 2 when they were caught violating. If subjects 
were in group 2 and they are observed to comply on inspection, then they were moved back into 
group 1 with a low or a high probability. The instructions, attached in the appendix, were framed 
using the terminology of this paragraph (i.e., “comply,” “violate,” “inspection,” “fine,” and so 
on). Comparison of our results with the more neutrally-framed terminology employed in Clark et 
al. (2004) suggests that framing does not have a substantial impact on the results.
4    
Each subject participated in a random number of periods in seven separate period 
sequences. The number of periods in each period sequence was determined before the session 
and was unknown to the subjects. Subjects in the same session faced the different treatments in 
different orders, which implies that our treatment comparisons control for sequencing effects. 
                                                 
4 For example, Clark et al. (2004) use “Option A” and “Option B” instead of “Comply” and “Violate.” Our  leverage 
treatment with compliance cost=200 and u=0.9 is most similar to the one treatment Clark et al. study, in that 
violation is optimal in group 1 and compliance is optimal in group 2, even though the compliance cost exceeds the 
expected fine in group 2. Clark et al. observe overall compliance rates of 12 percent in group 1 and 75 percent in 
group 2, whereas in our similar treatment we observe overall compliance rates of 11 percent in group 1 and 63 
percent in group 2. While obviously not identical, these rates are similar—especially considering the many other 
procedural, training and payment design differences between our and Clark et al.’s experiment.   9
The random ordering also leads to an approximately equal number of decisions in each 
treatment. As explained in the instructions, each period there was a 90 percent chance that the 
same period sequence continued for an additional period. This implements a discount factor 
β=0.9. Subjects were only told at the end of the last period in a sequence that a new period 
sequence would now begin.  
The period sequences were a combination of two treatment variables, both varied within 
sessions, in a three-by-two factorial design. For one treatment variable we vary the compliance 
costs (c) across three levels from low to medium to high to determine whether subjects change 
their compliance decisions in the presence of different levels of compliance costs. The 
compliance costs are 100 in the low cost scenario, 200 in the medium cost and 375 in the high 
cost case.  For the other treatment variable we manipulate at two levels the probability (u) of 
subjects moving from group 2 to group 1 to determine whether subjects comply more when the 
probability of switching groups is higher. Subjects face a switching probability of 0.1 in some 
period sequences and 0.9 in others. As noted above, these enforcement parameters do not 
represent the “optimal” parameters derived in the Harrington model; instead, they reflect our 
design goal to explore a variety of compliance conditions with strong and weak incentives to 
comply or violate in the different inspection groups. We also employ a seventh treatment that 
served as a baseline with very low compliance costs (7) and u=0.9, for which compliance is 
always optimal. All subjects made compliance decisions in all treatment variable combinations.  
 
4: Results 
4.1  Overall Violation Rates 
Figure 1 presents the average violation rate for later periods in the period sequences,   10
along with the steady state predicted violation rates, for each of the seven treatments. The 
predicted violation rate is 0 when compliance policy f00 is optimal, and it is 1 when compliance 
policy f11 is optimal. When policy f10 is optimal, the predicted violation rate is the stationary 
probability of being in inspection group 1, p2u/(p1+p2u). The figure shows that violations usually 
increase when they are predicted to increase, but that they do not reach the corner solution rates 
of 0 or 1 when policies f00 or f11 are optimal. 
Table 3 presents the overall violation rates separately for the compliance cost (c), 
switching probability (u) and inspection group combinations. The model predicts that for our 
experimental parameters, subjects will violate whenever they are in inspection group 1 except for 
the baseline treatment with a very low compliance cost of 7. Table 3a shows that this prediction 
is broadly supported, with observed violation rates of subjects in group 1 between 73 and 93 
percent when violation is predicted. These rates typically increase for the later sequences 5-7 
when subjects have more experience across treatments, as shown in parentheses in the table. The 
violation rate is 17 percent in the baseline treatment, for which violation is not predicted. 
  For the parameters employed in the experiment, the model predicts violation in only 3 of 
the 7 treatment cells when subjects are in inspection group 2. Subjects should not violate in the 
low compliance cost (7 and 100) case and should violate in the high compliance cost (375) case, 
irrespective of the value of the switching probability u. In the medium compliance cost (200) 
case they should violate only when they are unlikely to escape from inspection group 2 (u=0.1). 
Table 3b indicates that violations are more common when they are predicted, but that in all 7 
cases the violation rates differ from the predicted rates by at least 13 percentage points, even   11
when considering only the late sequences 5-7. Violations also rise when moving to the right or 
upward in Table 3b.
5 
  Table 3b clearly shows that subjects do not dramatically switch from never violating to 
always violating when the expected return from violating exceeds the expected return from 
compliance. Figure 2 illustrates the contrast between the sharp never/always violate prediction of 
the model and the smoothly monotonically increasing violation rate observed in the experiment. 
This figure is based on choices in inspection group 2 only, and it also displays the ratio of 
expected profits from violating to the expected profits from compliance. These expected profits 
are based on the discounted, infinitely repeated compliance choice problem with the optimal 
compliance policy followed in all subsequent periods. The model predicts a violation rate of 1 if 
and only if this ratio exceeds 1. The observed violation rate, however, is merely higher whenever 
this ratio indicates a higher return to violation. (An exception to this occurs for one transition: 
compliance cost=200 and u=0.1 to compliance cost=375 and u=0.9.) In other words, subjects’ 
choices appear to be sensitive to the relative payoffs from violation and compliance, but the 
overall averages do not switch from one corner solution prediction to the other at the sharp 
threshold when the ratio passes through one. We return to this issue in Section 4.3 where we 
explain this behavior using a simple model of boundedly-rational, or “noisy,” decision-making. 
  Clearly the data do not support the point predictions of the model, but they are consistent 
with many of the comparative static predictions about how the compliance rates differ in the 
various treatment cells. For formal tests we do not use the overall averages displayed in Table 3, 
                                                 
5 These deviations from the optimal compliance choices are not explained by individual subjects who were 
“chronic” violators or by subjects who may derive utility from being “honest” and comply constantly even when 
violation is more profitable. Indeed, we find no evidence that such extreme behaviors were present, based on our 
analysis of individual subjects’ play. All subjects violated at least one-third of the time and complied at least 15 
percent of the time. As shown below, most individual subjects’ compliance choices changed in response to the 
different incentives generated by the different enforcement treatments.   12
since individual subjects made multiple compliance choices and therefore the data points in this 
table are not statistically independent. Fortunately, we can conduct rather powerful tests based on 
statistically independent observations of individual subjects’ compliance rates and compliance 
rate differences across treatment cells. Recall that 114 individual subjects participated in this 
study, and they did not interact at all so each provides statistically independent observations. 
Therefore, for example, to test whether the violation rate in inspection group 2 for u=0.9 is 
significantly higher when compliance cost=375 than when compliance cost=200, we first 
calculate the violation rate for each individual subject within those two treatment cells. We then 
calculate the difference in these rates for the 70 individual subjects who made choices in both 
treatment cells, and employ a nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test to determine whether 
these differences are significantly different from zero. 
  This statistically conservative and yet powerful (due to our sample size) procedure yields 
the following conclusions. All statements are based on a five-percent significance threshold. 
  First, violation rates are significantly higher when in inspection group 1 than when in 
inspection group 2 for all 7 treatment cells. Note that the model predicts a significant difference 
in only 3 of the treatment cells (i.e., for both u=0.1 and 0.9 when compliance cost=100 and when 
u=0.9 and compliance cost=200).  
  Second, when in inspection group 1 the violation rate increases significantly when the 
compliance cost increases in 3 of the 5 pairwise comparisons: for u=0.1 when moving from 
compliance cost=100 to 200, and for u=0.9 when moving from compliance cost=7 to 100 and 
when moving from 100 to 200. When in inspection group 2 the violation rate increases 
significantly when the compliance cost increases in 4 of the 5 pairwise comparisons: all cases 
except for u=0.9 when moving from compliance cost=7 to 100. Note that the data support all 3   13
compliance cost treatment effects predicted by the model (for u=0.1, when moving from 
compliance cost=100 to 200 in inspection group 1, and for u=0.9, when moving from compliance 
cost=200 to 375 in inspection group 2 and when moving from compliance cost=7 to 100 in 
inspection group 1). However, also note that 4 additional differences are also significant (these 
are, for u=0.1, when moving from compliance cost=100 to 200 in inspection group 1 and from 
compliance cost=200 to 375 in inspection group 2; and for u=0.9, when moving from 
compliance cost=100 to 200 in both inspection groups)..  
  Third, the violation rate is significantly higher when u=0.1 than when u=0.9 for all 3 
pairwise comparisons when subjects are in inspection group 2. This is predicted only for the 
medium compliance cost=200 case, where the leverage of the two inspection groups is greatest. 
The violation rate is not significantly different for any of the 3 pairwise u comparisons when 
subjects are in inspection group 1, as predicted by the model. 
  These statistical conclusions generally hold for alternative subsets of the data, including 
for compliance choices based on only the initial inspection group that subjects are randomly 
assigned to, or compliance rates based only on subjects who have at least three compliance 
choices for a particular treatment cell. They are also robust to alternative statistical tests such as a 
simple nonparametric sign test or the standard parametric t-test. 
4.2  Classification of Strategies 
  The violation rates just analyzed separately for each compliance cost (c), switching 
probability (u) and inspection group combination employ a state-by-state perspective of this 
choice problem that differs from the strategy specification of Harrington’s model. Recall that 
agents in the model adopt an entire compliance policy; for example, if they adopt strategy f10 
they violate when in inspection group 1 and comply when in inspection group 2. Therefore, in   14
this section we examine the entire sequence of compliance choices within treatment cells to 
classify individual subjects’ compliance policies. The main difficulty we encounter in this 
classification is that some subjects do not make choices in both inspection groups and so their 
observed choices are consistent with multiple policies. Table 4 presents the classification for 
only those subjects who can be perfectly classified into a specific strategy for a particular 
treatment, and Table 5 classifies every subject based on her “best-fitting” strategy. 
  Table 4 classifies an individual subject as choosing compliance policy f11 for a particular 
treatment cell if they always violate in that cell, regardless of which inspection group they are in. 
We classify an individual in compliance policy f10 for a cell if they always violate when in 
inspection group 1 and never violate when in inspection group 2. The classifications for f01 and 
f00 are defined analogously. Some subjects never make choices in one of the inspection groups 
for some treatment cells, so we have no data to classify their behavior in that group. These cases 
are denoted with question marks. For example, f1? indicates that a subject always violated in 
inspection group 1, but never made decisions in inspection group 2. This individual’s behavior is 
consistent with both f10 and f11. In the summary sections in Table 4 we count observations as 
consistent with f10, for example, if they are identified in the “frequency (rate)” section as f1?, f?0 or 
f10. Likewise, we count observations as consistent with f11 if they are identified in the “frequency 
(rate)” section as f1?, f?1  or  f11, and we count observations as consistent with f00 if they are 
identified in the “frequency (rate)” section as f0?, f?0 or f00. The percentage of individuals who are 
classifiable as consistent with each policy does not sum to 100 percent because of the “question 
mark” subjects whose choices are consistent with two policies. 
  Clearly we have a large number of subjects who are not classifiable into any policy, 
ranging from 37 to 70 percent of the individuals depending on the treatment cell. In Table 5 we   15
therefore present an alternative classification based on the policy that provides a best-fit to each 
individual subject’s choices. This simple procedure counts the number of “errors” assuming 
subjects follow a particular strategy, and yields a strategy classification for every subject that 
minimizes the number of errors in classification. For some subjects, however, two policies are 
equally best-fitting. This occurs most frequently when subjects do not make choices in both 
inspection groups.  
The results are largely consistent across the two classification methods in the two tables. 
Both indicate that more subjects are consistent with the optimal policy (shown in bold on the 
tables) than any other policy for 6 treatment cells, with the exception being the cell where 
compliance cost is medium and u = 0.1. In this cell, for example, Table 5 shows that 60 percent 
are consistent with policy f10 and 54 percent are consistent with the optimal policy f11. For all 
other conditions, at least two-thirds of the subjects’ strategies are consistent with the optimal 
policy. The switching probability u can be an important determinant in the individual’s decision 
making, particularly so when the compliance costs are high. When the compliance costs = 375, 
more subjects are consistent with f10 when u = 0.9 than when u = 0.1, although the optimal policy 
f11 is still played by a larger percentage of the subjects. For these high compliance costs—which 
are more than double the single period expected penalty—apparently some individuals increase 
their compliance rates because of the greater opportunity of moving back to the good group 1 as 
u increases. This suggests that leverage works to some degree even when it is not predicted to 
work by the model. 
 Taken together, these points concerning the classification rates suggest that (1) some 
subjects’ behavior is either confused or consistent with some alternative model we have yet to 
consider; and (2) a large portion of subjects choose the compliance policy predicted by the   16
Harrington model. The next subsection presents an alternative choice model in an attempt to 
make sense of some of the systematic deviations from this model. 
4.3  A Noisy Choice Model 
  The Harrington model predicts that subjects choose the optimal compliance policy with 
probability one, regardless of whether this policy provides a return that is, for example, 331 
percent higher or 10 percent higher than the next best alternative. Figure 2, however, shows that 
although subjects are more likely to choose strategies that provide greater expected profits, their 
likelihood of choosing the optimal strategy increases when its return is greater relative to its 
alternatives. This suggests that a “noisy choice” model that permits errors in decision-making 
might be useful to understand our experimental outcomes. In what follows we employ a “quantal 
choice” model that accounts for boundedly-rational decision-making. This model allows subjects 
to make errors, but it accounts, in an intuitive way, for the fact that subjects are less likely to 
make errors that are more costly.
6 
  We use the logit form of the quantal choice model first introduced by Luce (1959) and 
popularized more recently by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) in a game-theoretic context as a 
quantal response equilibrium. In our study subjects are not playing a strategic game—just a game 
against nature since the inspector is not strategic. The idea is therefore quite simple: If strategy i 

















The parameter µ is estimated from the data and scales the sensitivity that subjects have to the 
                                                 
6 Figure 2 clearly shows how deviations from the optimal choice depend on the relative profitability of the different 
choices, and thus rejects alternative choice error models like the Noisy Nash model that do not account for relative 
payoffs. In the Noisy Nash model the agent makes his optimal choice with probability γ and randomizes (uniformly) 
over all choices, independent of their relative payoffs, with probability 1−γ (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998).   17
relative payoffs (in terms of utility) of the various choices. As µ decreases the subjects put less 
probability weight on choices that yield suboptimal choices, and the probability that they make 
the optimal choice approaches one as µ approaches zero. As µ approaches infinity, subjects 
choose their available strategies with equal probability, independent of the relative expected 
payoffs. 
  This framework also allows us to determine if risk aversion, either as a competing or a 
complementary explanation to this type of boundedly rational decision making, might also 
explain the deviations from optimal choices. Risk aversion is sometimes argued to lead to higher 
compliance rates than is predicted as risk averse subjects could be very sensitive to the 
probability of being caught (Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1992). The greater risk of a fine increases 
the cost of violating while leaving unchanged the returns from complying. To introduce risk 
aversion in a simple way we posit a constant relative risk averse utility function for each subject 
of the form 
1 () / ( 1 ) U
α π πα
− =− , where π is the dollar payoff for the choice and α is the index of 
relative risk aversion. We can estimate both µ and α by maximum likelihood techniques within 
the same model. If α is significantly positive while µ is near zero, this would suggest that risk 
aversion rather than bounded rationality is a primary cause of the deviations from the optimal 
choice. We obtain the opposite result, however. In all of our estimates, whether looking at only 
late periods, only early periods, or all decisions, we find the maximum likelihood estimate of α 
to be 0 but µ to be positive and highly significant. Therefore, we reject risk aversion as a main 
explanation of our results and focus on the bounded rationality term µ. 
  To evaluate this model we look at individual choices within an inspection group, similar 
to the analysis in Section 4.1 above (and Table 3). We consider 3 choices for the subjects: 
compliance policies f00, f10 and f11, but not policy f01 since f01 is never optimal and is always   18
played less frequently than other policies (as documented in Tables 4 and 5). We translate the 
rates at which subjects choose these compliance strategies into observed violation rates for each 
inspection group. Table 6 presents the maximum likelihood estimate for µ, pooling across all 6 
main treatment cells (i.e., all treatments except the baseline compliance cost=7). We present 
results for all periods pooled, as well as results separating the early session treatment sequences 
from the late session treatment sequences. Consistent with previous research that employs this 
quantal choice approach (e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), the choice errors decline as subjects 
gain experience. This is reflected in the significantly lower µ estimate for the late period 
sequences. 
  Figure 3 illustrates the remarkable success that this simple, one-parameter model has in 
explaining the deviations from the optimal choices, based on the pooled estimate for the entire 
dataset.
7 It is important to keep in mind that the noise parameter does not provide freedom to 
explain any deviations; instead, each particular value of µ is consistent with only one specific 
combination of deviations across our treatments. Nevertheless, all of the observed violation rates 
are accurately predicted by the model, with the greatest deviation only 14 percent. Moreover, the 
model accurately captures the qualitative differences across treatments, such as the higher group 
1 violation rates when the compliance cost is greater. 
 
  5: Discussion 
Enforcement and monitoring of regulatory compliance policies can incur substantial 
resource costs. Dynamic audit models help us in understanding how individuals and firms might 
behave when faced with enforcement and compliance rules that are conditional on actions in 
                                                 
7 We could obviously fit the observed rates more accurately with treatment cell-specific µ estimates. As Haile et al. 
(2003) have recently emphasized, however, it is important to leave the estimated parameter unchanged across 
treatments to make comparative statics exercises informative.   19
previous and current periods. Harrington’s (1988) important model demonstrates how a regulator 
could use multiple inspection groups to increase enforcement leverage when political or other 
practical considerations limit the size of fines. While there is a body of theoretical research in 
this area, empirical analysis of the compliance strategies of individuals in this dynamic 
framework is limited by a lack of observability for key variables in the theories.   
Laboratory evidence presented in this paper shows that in a broad sense many subjects’ 
behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions of this dynamic enforcement model. 
Overall violation rates are significantly higher in group 1 than in group 2. When compliance 
costs are higher then the violation rates increase significantly. We also obtain clear support for 
the more subtle prediction that compliance increases in the “bad” group 2 if it is more likely to 
be rewarded with a transition back to the “good” group 1. That is, our results support the general 
idea of enforcement leverage through transitions across multiple groups. 
An examination of the compliance policies chosen by the subjects reveals that a large 
proportion of the subjects choose the strategy predicted by the Harrington model. Subjects in our 
experiments do not, however, follow the sharp predictions of the model. The deviations are more 
pronounced when the model makes corner solution predictions even though the differences in 
expected profits are marginal for alternative policies or actions. To account for this we consider a 
quantal choice model where subjects are assumed to be boundedly rational. When faced with 
regulatory policies, the standard rational choice model assumes that firms and individuals would 
choose strategies that increase their payoffs. They might not choose the exact optimal strategy at 
all times; i.e., they may make some mistakes, although it seems sensible that they would tend to 
make fewer mistakes when the mistakes are more costly. This aspect of bounded rationality is 
often neglected in a policy setting.    20
To understand firm behavior and formulate policies that provide incentives for better 
regulatory enforcement, our results suggest that more attention can be paid to models that 
incorporate noisy decision making. The quantal choice model accurately accounts for the 
boundedly rational behavior of our laboratory subjects, and it may also be useful for describing 
compliance choices of agents in the field. Enforcement models themselves might also be more 
accurate if they incorporate bounded rationality explicitly. For example, the Harrington model 
implies optimal endogenous enforcement parameters to maximize efficiency (for each particular 
compliance cost) in which the firm only slightly prefers to comply rather than violate in the high 
intensity inspection group. Since at this margin the firm is nearly indifferent between the two 
strategies, the alternative behavioral prediction from the quantal choice model instead predicts 
that the firm would comply only about half the time.  
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Table 1: Payoff Parameters for Enforcement Game 
 
  Group 1  Group 2 
 Comply  Violate  Comply  Violate 
Inspection 
Probability 
p1 = 0.2  p2 = 0.5 
No Inspection  c = 100, 200, 375 
(baseline c = 7) 
0  c = 100, 200, 375 
(baseline c = 7) 
0 
     
Inspection   c=100, 200, 375  F1 = 50  c = 100, 200, 375  F2 = 300 
  moved  to  G2 
with Prob =1 
Prob(moved 












Table 2: Expected Payoff of Alternative Policies 
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Firm Exits Group 2 












  371/511 = 73% 
(158/206=77%) 
210/243 = 86% 
(59/68=87%) 









136/795 = 17% 
(69/395=17%) 
506/607 = 83% 
(151/177=85%) 
538/603 = 89% 
(210/218=96%) 




0 1  1  1 
Note: Data for late sequences 5-7 only are shown in parentheses. 
 
 




Firm Exits Group 2 












  116/526 = 22% 
(54/217=25%) 
359/732 = 49% 
(115/244=47%) 









28/188 = 15% 
(21/130=16%) 
65/359 = 18% 
(20/135=15%) 
138/369 = 37% 
(45/154=29%) 




0 0  0  1 
Note: Data for late sequences 5-7 only are shown in parentheses.   25






Exits Group 2 















f00 frequency (rate) 
f01 frequency (rate) 
f0? frequency (rate) 
f1? frequency (rate) 
f10 frequency (rate) 
f11 frequency (rate) 
f?0 frequency (rate) 
f?1 frequency (rate) 
other freq. (rate) 
Total subjects 

































f00 consistent (rate) 
f10 consistent (rate) 
f01 consistent (rate) 
f11 consistent (rate) 
Classifiable subjects 
Optimal Policy 

























f00 frequency (rate) 
f01 frequency (rate) 
f0? frequency (rate) 
f1? frequency (rate) 
f10 frequency (rate) 
f11 frequency (rate) 
f?0 frequency (rate) 
f?1 frequency (rate) 













































f00 consistent (rate) 
f10 consistent (rate) 
f01 consistent (rate) 



























Note: The percentage rates shown in the frequency section of the table are percentages of the 
total number of subjects making choices in that treatment condition. The percentage rates shown 
in the consistent section of the table are percentages of the classifiable subjects in that treatment 
condition. These latter percentages sum to greater than 100 percent because some subjects’ 
observed choices are consistent with multiple compliance policies.   26





Exits Group 2 











f00 frequency (rate) 
f10 frequency (rate) 
f01 frequency (rate) 
f11 frequency (rate) 
Total subjects 
 





















f00 frequency (rate) 
f10 frequency (rate) 
f01 frequency (rate) 



























Optimal Policy  f00  f10  f10  f11 
Note: The percentage rates shown in the frequency section of the table are percentages of the 
total number of subjects whose choices minimize the number of deviations from the indicated 
strategy in that treatment condition. The percentages sum to greater than 100 percent because 
some subjects’ observed choices are best fit by two different compliance policies, particularly 






Table 6:  Quantal Choice Model Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Dataset  µ estimate 
(standard error) 
Log-likelihood Number  of 
Observations 
All Periods  976 
(35) 
-2927.6 5764 
Early Sequences 1-4  1144 
(57) 
-1915.4 3553 
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Observed Violation Rate, After Period 3
Observed Violation Rate, After Period 10
Policy f00 is 
Optimal
Policy f11 is Optimal
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E(Profit | Violate)/E(Profit | Comply)
Predicted Violation Rate
Actual Overall Violation Rate
(3.31)  29







































































Quantal Choice Violation Rate
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Instructions 
General 
  This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  The instructions are simple 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you will earn money that will be paid 
to you privately in cash. All earnings on your computer screens are in Experimental Dollars. 
These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a 
rate of           Experimental Dollars = 1 real Dollar. Notice that the more Experimental Dollars 
that you earn, the more cash that you receive at the end of the experiment. 
  You are going to make a simple decision to either “Comply” or “Violate” in each period. 
We will conduct a random number of periods in seven separate period sequences. Attached to 
these instructions you will find a sheet labeled Personal Record Sheet, which will help you keep 
track of your earnings based on the decisions you make. You are not to reveal this information to 
anyone. It is your own private information. 
 
Your Decision 
  Each period you decide whether to pay your compliance cost. This compliance cost may 
vary across period sequences, but it remains unchanged for every period within a period 
sequence. You pay the compliance cost only if you chose Comply. If you choose Violate, your 
compliance cost is zero. Each period you receive revenue, regardless of what you do. So your 
earnings each period are determined as follows: 
 
Earnings = Fixed Period Revenue – Compliance Cost (only if you choose to Comply)  
    – Fines Paid (if any). 
 
Your Fixed Period Revenue does not depend on any actions you take, and does not change 
throughout the experiment. (In fact, it is already written on your Personal Record Sheet.) You 
make your compliance decision by filling out an Inspection Report, illustrated in Figure 1, 
simply by selecting either the Comply or Violate button and then clicking Continue. 
   31
Inspections 
  The inspector may or may not “inspect” you to determine if you decided to comply or 
not. The probability (or, “likelihood”) that he inspects you depends on which Inspection Group 
you are currently in, as shown on the bottom of Figure 1. These probabilities do not change 
during the entire experiment. If he does not inspect you, then whether or not you decided to 
comply is irrelevant. None of the numbers shown in Figure 1 change within a period sequence, 





  If he does inspect you, you do not pay a fine if you chose Comply, but you do pay a fine 
if you chose Violate. The size of the fine depends on which Inspection Group you are currently 
in, as shown at the bottom of Figure 1. These fines also do not change during the entire 
experiment.   32
  If you are in Inspection Group 1 and are inspected and chose to Violate, then you will 
automatically be moved to Inspection Group 2. If you are in Inspection Group 2 and are 
inspected and chose to Comply, then you may be moved back into Inspection Group 1. The 
probability that you would be moved back to Group 1 is shown on the bottom right of your 




Figure 2  
 
Period Results 
  Whether or not you are inspected and a summary of the results from the period are shown 
on the Period Results screen; Figure 2 presents an example. Your cash holdings are updated for 
the next period (and remember, these are the cash holdings that get converted into actual dollars 
at the end of the experiment). You should copy this information onto your Personal Record Sheet 
at the end of each period, and then click “continue” to begin the next period.   33
Starting a New Sequence of Periods 
  Remember that which Inspection Group you are in depends on your decisions and 
whether or not you were inspected. However, each period there is a 10% (“1 out of 10”) chance 
that we will start a new period sequence, with a possibly new compliance cost and a new 
probability of moving from Group 2 to Group 1 if you were inspected and found in compliance 
when in Group 2. Whenever we start a new sequence, everyone is randomly assigned into 
Inspection Groups 1 or 2, regardless of any decisions or inspections that have occurred so far in 
the experiment. Each period there is a 90% (“9 out of 10”) chance that we will continue in the 
same period sequence, in which your Inspection Group depends on your previous decisions and 
whether or not you were inspected. The random “draw” that determines whether we start a new 
period sequence is independent each period, so it does not depend on how many periods have 
been conducted so far in a sequence. The experimenter determined the random final period of 
each sequence before today’s experiment. But you will not learn which period of each sequence 
is randomly chosen to be the last period of that sequence until that last period is completed. We 
will conduct a total of 7 separate period sequences in today’s experiment. 
Summary 
•  You decide to Comply or Violate each period. You pay a compliance cost if you chose to 
Comply, and you pay zero compliance cost if you chose to Violate. This compliance cost 
may vary in different period sequences. 
•  You may be inspected each period to see if you chose to Comply. If you are not inspected 
you do not pay a fine. If you were inspected and chose to comply you do not pay a fine. If 
you were inspected and chose to Violate you pay a fine. 
•  The likelihood that you are inspected and your fine depends on which Inspection Group you 
are in. 
•  You move from Inspection Group 1 to Inspection Group 2 if you were inspected and you 
chose to Violate. You might move from Inspection Group 2 back to Inspection Group 1 if 
you were inspected and you chose to Comply, and the chances of making this move may 
vary in different period sequences. 
•  Each period there is a 10% (“1 out of 10”) chance that the sequence ends, and at the start of a 
new period sequence everyone is randomly reassigned into Inspection Groups 1 and 2. 
Are there any questions now before we begin the experiment? 